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This article analyses stability and volatility of party preferences using data from the 
Swiss Household-Panel (SHP), which, for the first time, allow studying transitions and 
stability of voters over several years in Switzerland. Analyses cover the years 1999–
2007 and systematically distinguish changes between party blocks and changes within 
party blocks. The first part looks at different patterns of change, which show relatively 
high volatility. The second part tests several theories on causes of such changes apply-
ing a multinomial random-effects model. Results show that party preferences stabilise 
with their duration and with age and that the electoral cycle, political sophistication, 
socio-structural predispositions, the household-context as well as party size and the 
number of parties each explain part of electoral volatility. Different results for within- 
and between party-block changes underlie the importance of that differentiation. 
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Introduction
Volatility is a central aspect of voting behaviour that is frequently analysed 
at the aggregate level at the basis of electoral outcome. At the individual 
level, we know however relatively little on the mechanisms behind volatil-
ity in voting behaviour. In this article we will look at such individual dy-
namics using data of the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) from 1999–2007. 
We will take account of three different theoretical approaches. Firstly, 
stability is a central part of traditional models of electoral choice. Accord-
ing to the Columbia school (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948) and cleavage theory 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967), stability is attributed to the high influence of 
(relatively fixed) socio-structural characteristics that link electoral groups 
and parties. In the Michigan Model of electoral choice (Campbell et al. 
1960), voters and parties are primarily tied by psychological attachments, 
1  I like to thank Hanspeter Kriesi and the two anonymous reviewers for the helpful com-
ments and suggestions on earlier versions of this article.
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which are – together with issues and candidate image – the central vari-
ables in the explanatory model of voting choice. These stable and enduring 
party identifications are acquired during political socialisation and predis-
pose individuals to vote for the same party in successive elections. Despite 
processes of dealignment, party choice has shown to still depend on party 
attachments and socio-structural characteristics, so that we can expect 
them to also influence individual volatility. Besides, the Columbia school 
also emphasized the role of contextual influences on voting behaviour. In 
recent years, particularly within-household influences have come back into 
the focus of electoral research. 
A second body of literature on volatility looks at opinion formation 
during campaigns and focuses mostly on psychological explanations. For 
our research question, we will apply Zaller’s influential Reiceive-Accept-
Sample (RAS) model (1992), according to which political sophistication 
has a central role as an indirect moderating variable in the explanation of 
opinion change. Thirdly we will take account of literature on aggregate 
dynamics of voting behaviour, which concentrates on party system charac-
teristics and cleavages as explanatory variables. Bartolini and Mair (1990) 
argue that electoral volatility in Western democracies points to stability in 
the long run when party blocks are considered. Party blocks consist of par-
ties located on the same sides of the relevant cleavages. Because relative 
stability at the aggregate level could mask volatility at the individual level, 
it is important to test findings with individual data, too (e.g. Zuckerman 
1992: 553). 
For our study, we combine insights from these different fields. Our aim 
is firstly to describe dynamics of party preferences in Switzerland and sec-
ondly to explain when and why changes between parties occur. Analyses 
systematically distinguish within-block and between-block changes. The 
main variable of interest is party preference measured by voting inten-
tion with the following question: “If there was an election for the National 
Council tomorrow, for which party would you vote?” 
Literature on individual-level volatility in party preference is relatively 
scarce. In Switzerland, studies have been limited to data with two observa-
tion points (e.g. Nicolet and Sciarini 2006; Lachat 2007) and mostly relied 
on data on recalled voting. For Germany and the United Kingdom, there are 
a number of articles on stability of party preference using household panel 
data (e.g. Kohler 2002; Johnston et al. 2005; Zuckerman 2005; Zuckerman 
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et al. 2007).2 The theoretical interest of these studies is however limited 
to the influence of socio-structural variables, particularly of within-house-
hold influences. More frequently analysed with panel data is the stability of 
party identification, where the question whether party identification reacts 
to short term influences is subject to an extensive debate (e.g. Falter et al. 
2000; Green et al. 2002; Green and Yoon 2002; Wawro 2002; Clarke et al. 
2004; Arzheimer and Schoen 2005; Schmitt-Beck et al. 2006). 
The next section outlines the theoretical framework and presents the 
hypotheses. The section afterwards describes the data source. A descrip-
tive account of patterns of stability and change over nine years follows. 
Then, we model change in party preference as a function of the variables 
presented in the theoretical part. The last section concludes.
Theory
Contextual Influence
Literature provides much evidence that individual behaviour is influenced 
by the environment. Such contextual effects are attributed to households, 
neighbourhoods, regions, the workplace, other group affiliations or media 
content and have already been a central aspect in the early electoral stud-
ies by Lazarsfeld et al. (1948). Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) present the 
following elements in their line of arguments of why party preferences 
depend on social context: Firstly, citizens value political information but 
they prefer to obtain it inexpensively. Secondly, exposure and interpreta-
tion of information is biased according to previous preferences and predis-
positions. Thirdly, control over information is incomplete and information 
flow increases with the extent that individuals share the same locations in 
the social structure. Finally, information processing can be viewed as a so-
cial learning process, where citizens are rewarded or punished for political 
viewpoints that agree or conflict with the viewpoints of others. 
This explanatory mechanism can relatively easily be extended from ef-
fects of social interactions to effects of media or elite discourse. Media 
effects are also driven by the need of information, by a biased perception 
2  For Germany, these authors present their hypotheses as referring to party preference, but 
empirical tests are based on party identification.
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of information and by a limited control over information flow. Effects of 
media and of social interactions depend on the same variables: the inten-
sity and frequency of information flow and the credibility of the informa-
tion source (Brady et al. 2006: 2; Zaller 1992; Zuckerman et al. 2007). 
In the following, we will concentrate on two possible influences of infor-
mation flow: the influences among household members and campaign ef-
fects. These variables should impact both within-block and between-block 
changes.
Because household members interact frequently and intensively and 
usually trust each other, household members strongly influence each other 
(Zuckerman et al. 2007). Most extensively studied so far have been effects 
between partners living in the same household (e.g. Lampard 1997; Brynin 
2000; Johnson et al. 2002, 2005; Kan and Heath 2006; Zuckerman et al. 
2007). Results show a strong political homogeneity, which is due to both 
initial selection and a considerable convergence over time. McPhee (1963) 
and Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) argue that preference change is mainly 
driven by disagreement between previously held preferences and incom-
ing information. If disagreement is recognized, an individual reconsiders 
her preferences. Then, the current opinion is either retained in the face of 
contrary opinion or the positions are adjusted, where most adjustments in-
crease homogeneity within an environment. Sears and Funk (1999) argue 
that also reinforcement of a preference by the environment or even absence 
of conflicting information has a stabilising effect. 
Some analyses have tried to parcel out influences between partners 
(Kan and Heath 2006; Zuckerman et al. 2007). Although results are some-
what contradictory, they agree in their finding of a strong mutual influence 
between partners. Some studies take also preferences of other household 
members than partners into account (Brynin 2000; Johnston et al. 2005; 
Zuckerman et al. 2007) and confirm the picture of strong mutual influence. 
In line with these studies, we expect mismatches in preferences of house-
hold members to increase the probability of a change in party preference 
(Hypothesis 1a) and agreement in party preference to decrease the prob-
ability of a change in party preference (Hypothesis 1b). 
The second contextual influence we look at involves the electoral cycle 
and campaign effects. Although the most important campaign effect is to 
activate existing predispositions (e.g. Lazarsfeld et al. 1948; Bartels 2006; 
Andersen et al. 2005: 285), campaigns also increase the probability to be 
confronted with considerations which contradict previous preferences. 
Campaigns might also have indirect effects by encouraging voters to make 
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more sophisticated decisions (Kenney and Kahn 1999) or by changing the 
salience of considerations due to short term influences. In consequence, 
party preferences might be different during a campaign than between cam-
paigns and we expect changes in party preference to become more frequent 
with closeness of electoral dates (Hypothesis 2). We consider particularly 
national elections, but also cantonal elections to be salient and thus to ef-
fect preference changes. 
Political Sophistication
Research in political psychology has shown that the impact of informa-
tion flow on opinion change varies among individuals. Especially Zaller’s 
RAS-model has had an enormous influence on research on opinion for-
mation. The central variable in the model is political sophistication, by 
which we understand an individual’s reception and comprehension of 
communications from the political environment (Zaller 1992). The dis-
tinction between receiving and accepting information leads to a non-linear 
relationship between individuals’ sophistication and attitude stability. The 
probability that someone is receptive to a signal is an increasing function 
of her political sophistication. Given reception of a signal, the probability 
that she believes or accepts the information is a decreasing function of 
her political sophistication. People most influenced by new information, 
then, are those with moderate levels of political awareness.3 While this 
model is usually applied for explaining volatility within a campaign, there 
is no reason why the same mechanism should not apply to volatility over 
a longer time-span. We expect electoral volatility first to increase and then 
to decrease with political sophistication (Hypothesis 3). This relationship 
should hold for both changes within- and between party blocks.
Stability of Voting and the Role of Predispositions 
The second important concept in Zaller’s model, apart from political so-
phistication, is predispositions defined as stable individual-level traits. The 
nature of predispositions and the causal mechanism of their influence re-
main however vague in his theory. But predispositions play also a crucial 
3  An alternative explanation on how political sophistication effects volatility is cognitive 
mobilisation (Dalton 2000). Hardly any empirical studies however found empirical support 
for such an effect (Albright 2009). Neither did Schmitt-Beck et al. (2006) find such an ef-
fect.
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role in traditional electoral theories which explain why voting behaviour 
is relatively stable. In the Columbia model (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948), predis-
positions are understood as socio-structural characteristics, first of all as 
social class. The link between social structure, the party system and stabil-
ity of voting is made even more explicitly by cleavage theory (Lipset and 
Rokkan 1967; Bartolini and Mair 1990). In the Michigan model (Camp-
bell et al. 1960), predispositions consist of (stable) psychological attach-
ments to parties. Irrespectively of the nature of predispositions – given that 
they affect voting choice – the stability of predispositions implies stability 
of voting choice (e. g. Butler and Stokes 1974; Miller and Shanks 1996; 
Clarke et al. 2004; Arzheimer and Schoen 2005). We will focus firstly on 
socio-structural predispositions and then on predispositions in the form of 
psychological attachments. 
Cleavage theory claims that the political space of competition is shaped 
by divisions between social groups. Social class and religion are usual-
ly considered to be the most important socio-structural cleavages. While 
evidence is unambiguous that the relevance of the traditional social class 
cleavage has declined (e.g. Dalton 1984), empirical studies show that so-
cial class remains relevant when divisions within the old middle class are 
taken account of (see Güveli and de Graaf 2007 for a review, Lachat 2007 
for Switzerland). Similarly, religion remains significant for voting when 
not only religious denomination but also religious practise is considered 
(Kriesi and Trechsel 2008). We will test whether socio-structural charac-
teristics still have the stabilising effect suggested by cleavage theory and 
sociological models of voting. The crucial point is that strength of socio-
structural predispositions varies among individuals. While some groups 
may have strong ties to particular parties, others have no clear predisposi-
tion towards any party. The higher socio-structural predispositions are, the 
stronger is the probability to vote for a particular party. Because predispo-
sitions are stable, this implies that stability in voting intention increases 
with strength in socio-structural predispositions (Hypothesis 4). Cleavages 
should affect changes between party blocks but not changes within party 
blocks, because parties in the same block do not differ in their positions 
along the main cleavage lines (Bartolini and Mair 1990: 36). 
In the Michigan model, predispositions consist of psychological attach-
ments to parties (which depend however also on socio-structural charac-
teristics). Also strength of these attachments varies between individuals. 
Strength of party identification has shown to be an important explanatory 
variable for the stability of electoral choice (Sciarini and Kriesi 2003; La-
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chat 2007). Because we have no measure of strength of party preference 
in our data, we cannot directly test its influence on stability. But in any 
case, such an empirical test would remain somewhat tautological, because 
strength and stability are causally very proximate to each other (Selb et 
al. 2009).4 To better understand mechanism behind stability, we therefore 
should focus at factors which are causes of both strength and stability of 
voting intentions and therefore less proximate causes.
Political socialisation is considered to be the most important cause of 
party identification (Campbell et al. 1960). We will however not directly 
consider it in our model. But additional to political socialisation, party 
identification stabilises further over time. Once an individual has formed 
a party attachment, it serves as a lens through which politics is perceived 
(Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1967). A partisan interprets an ambigu-
ous event to the advantage of the adopted party and to the disadvantage 
of the opposite party (Lewis-Beck et al. 2008: 148f.). We will capture this 
reinforcing mechanism of party preference with two variables. Firstly, a 
party preference should become more stable, the longer it has been held 
(Hypothesis 5).5 Secondly, strength and stability of party preference should 
increase with life experience in the sense that changes in party preference 
become less frequent with age (Hypothesis 6). Hypotheses 5 and 6 should 
hold for both types of changes.
Influence from the Party System
At the aggregate level, literature on volatility of party strength has focused 
at party system characteristics and cleavages as explanatory variables. If 
the party system is indeed central for volatility, this should also be relevant 
at the individual level. To take account of the party system in Switzerland, 
we firstly distinguish two types of parties. As large parties we consider the 
four parties represented in the federal executive in Switzerland (Federal 
4  Also party identification and electoral choice are very proximate concepts in a causal 
system (e.g. Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). Explaining stability in party preference by strength of 
party identification thus solves neither the problem of endogeneity nor of simultaneity. Em-
pirical tests for Western European multi party systems even suggest that party identification 
and voting cannot be empirically distinguished, as party identification is not more stable 
than party preference (Budge et al. 1976; Falter et al. 2000).
5  See Arzheimer and Schoen (2005: 631) and Schmitt-Beck et al. (2006) for an analogous 
argumentation for party identification.
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Council) in the period of observation.6 All other parties are considered 
as small parties. There are several reasons, why supporters of small par-
ties should be more volatile than supporters of large parties (Hypothesis 
7). Firstly, small parties have less decisive power both in legislative and 
executive bodies and weaker ties with other influential groups. Secondly, 
they have a kind of opposition role in Switzerland, as they are not repre-
sented in the federal executive. Often, rise in support for small parties is 
associated with a salient topic.7 They have increasing support as long as 
the issue is salient and the governmental parties do not well integrate that 
issue into their policies. 
Apart from party size, we include the number of parties into our mod-
els. These have shown to be important in comparisons between countries 
(Pedersen 1983; Bartolini and Mair 1990). Because party systems vary 
between cantons, we expect volatility of voting intention to increase with 
the number of parties in a canton (Hypothesis 8). Because changes in party 
preference due to party system characteristics do not refer to ideology but 
rather occur for strategic reasons, we expect party size and the number of 
parties to influence only changes within a party block. 
Data
We base our analysis on data of the first nine waves of the SHP from 
1999 to 2007. The data consist of a random sample of 5’074 Swiss private 
households drawn in 1999, where all household members above 14 years 
have been interviewed by telephone. These individuals have been followed 
over time with yearly questionnaires. This provides us with up to nine ob-
servation points per individual. A second random sample of 2’538 house-
holds has been followed starting in 2004. We exclude foreigners and indi-
viduals less than 18 years old, who do not have the right to vote, from the 
sample. Two different kinds of analysis will be carried out: in the section 
Patterns of Change we will look at trajectories over the whole period using 
the subsample of respondents who participated in all nine panel waves (N 
6  They cumulate to about 80% of the votes for the National Council in the period of obser-
vation. For the upper chamber of the National Parliament (two seats per canton), the four 
governmental parties occupy even more than 90% of the seats.
7  In Switzerland, this holds e.g. for the Green Party (environment), the Swiss Democrats 
(foreigners) and for the Freedom Party (automobiles).
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= 1’994). In the section Explaining Changes in Party Preference we will 
look at transitions between observation points which allow including all 
individuals having participated at least twice. 
It is necessary to briefly address the two main problems regarding the 
representativeness of panel data: initial non-participation which is a prob-
lem of all survey data and attrition which is a particularity of panel data. 
We do not present the analysis of such effects here, but only their implica-
tions for further analyses. Firstly, data of the SHP should primarily be used 
for analytic purposes and less for descriptive statistics. Attention is particu-
larly required where relative size of parties (voting shares) is concerned, 
as some parties are strongly overrepresented (SPS) and others underrepre-
sented (SVP) in the sample. Secondly, there are two opposing effects link-
ing the duration of the panel and stability observed. On the one hand, the 
more often we observe individuals, the more likely it is to observe a change 
in party preference. On the other, research on attrition shows that individu-
als staying in a sample are more stable in their behaviour than respondents 
leaving the panel (Lipps 2007). The more observations per individuals we 
require, the more likely is thus an overrepresentation of stable individuals. 
Examining these effects, we see that the number of changes increases quite 
linearly with the number of observations available which means that bias 
from attrition is limited. Thirdly we did not use weights for the results pre-
sented here. Weights provided with the SHP data have not been designed 
for transition analysis as applied here and correct for bias only to a very 
small extent. For the descriptive analyses, we ran our models also with 
weights provided, results however changed only marginally and weights 
have no effect on the conclusions. 
For all analyses we distinguish changes between- and within party 
blocks, where parties are classed into three blocks: left parties, centre-right 
parties and conservative-right parties. The classical opposition between 
left and right divides the left block from the two right blocks. The cultural 
opposition between the promoters of an open, cultural liberal Switzerland 
and the defenders of Swiss traditions divides the conservative right from 
the left and the centre-right block (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008: 96).8 This 
classification provides us with approximately equally sized party blocks 
according to voting shares. Each block comprises at least one of the four 
8  The distinction of three party blocks is in line with empirical analyses of the parties’ 
positioning in the electoral campaigns (Kriesi et al. 2006: 942), of referendum votes (Her-
mann and Leuthold 2003), of party recommendations for referendum votes (Suter et al. 
2009) and of voting behaviour of the members of the National Council (Kriesi 2001).
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biggest (and governmental) parties. Small parties have been attributed to 
the three blocks according to their positions on the left-right axis estab-
lished in expert surveys (Hug and Schulz 2007).9 To test whether the con-
struction of three party blocks is empirically reasonable for our analysis 
compared to only two party blocks (as considered by Bartolini and Mair), 
we can compare the number of changes between party blocks. If three party 
blocks are reasonable, changes between the left block and the centre-right 
block should have similar frequencies as changes between the centre-right 
block and the conservative-right block. This is indeed the case in our data. 
Among all transitions, 1’061 are changes between the left and the centre-
right party block and 1’031 are changes between the centre-right and the 
conservative-right block. 418 changes occurred between the left and the 
conservative-right block.
Patterns of Change
In order to look at patterns of change from 1999 to 2007, we limit our 
analysis to respondents having participated in all nine yearly panel waves. 
While transitions between two waves can easily be represented in a transi-
tion matrix, a description of individual trajectories over nine panel waves 
is not straight forward because there are millions of different possibilities. 
We therefore classed individual patterns into one of the five following cat-
egories: 
Stable party preference: the respondent named the same party in all 
waves.
No party preference: the respondent never indicated a party pref-
erence, but responded any of the following in all waves: does not 
know, vote for no party, does not vote, vote for candidates and not 
for parties.10 
9  Left parties: Social-Democratic Party (SPS), Worker’s Party (PdA), Green Party (GPS), 
Socialist Green Alternative and Women Groups. Centre-right parties: Liberal Party (FDP 
and LPS), Christian-Democratic Party (CVP), Independent Alliance (LdU), Christian So-
cial Party (CSP), Evangelical Party (EVP). Conservative-right parties: Swiss People’s Party 
(SVP), Federal Democratic Union (EDU), Freedom Party (FP), Swiss Democrats (SD), 
Lega dei Ticinesi (LEGA).
10  In the Swiss electoral system, citizens have the possibility to vote for any combination of 
candidates, irrespectively of the party affiliation of those candidates (panachage). Yet, most 
voters vote for candidates of the same party and provide a party name when asked about 
their voting choice.
1.
2.
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Preference – no preference: the respondent expressed at least once 
no party preference (see Point 2) and at least once a party preference. 
Whenever she named a party preference it was for the same party. 
Change within party blocks: respondents named at least two differ-
ent parties during the nine years, but all the parties named belong to 
the same block. Answers not containing a particular party (see Point 
2) are possible at any time.
Change between party blocks: respondents named at least two dif-
ferent parties during the nine years, where the parties belong to dif-
ferent blocks. Answers not containing a particular party (see Point 
2) are possible at any time.
Frequencies of the five different patterns are displayed in Figure 1. Most 
frequent (27%) are those changing between a particular party preference 
and no preference. 18 percent have a stable party preference defined as 
having named the same party in all waves. Together, these two groups 
with respondents having named only one party encompass 45 percent of 
the sample. The share of respondents having switched their party prefer-
ence is of about equal size: 18 percent of respondents change only within 
blocks and 25 percent have changed at least once between blocks. 12 per-
cent never articulated a party preference. 
The fact that changes between party blocks are more frequent than 
changes within party blocks is an unexpected result. A closer look at the 
transitions between parties reveals that about half (51%) of all between-
block changes involve the SVP (13% from or to a party of the left party 
block and 38% from or to a party of the centre-right party block). The fre-
quent changes between party blocks thus reflect the rise of the SVP which 
has transformed the Swiss party system from the 1990’s on and can be 
seen as a particularity of the period of observation considered. Apart from 
the transformation of the party system, the proportion of between-block 
changes depends heavily on the construction of party blocks and on how 
many waves of data we take into account.11 For these reasons and because 
there are no comparable analyses for Switzerland, it is not easy to qualify 
these frequencies. Our results are however in so far in line with similar 
analyses for Germany and Great Britain (Clarke et al. 2004; Schmitt-Beck 
11  The consideration of only two party blocks (left and right) would have resulted in 27% 
of respondents changing within a party block and only 16% changing between blocks.
3.
4.
5.
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Figure 1: Patterns of Change over Nine Yearly Observations: Frequencies (N = 1’994)
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et al. 2006; Zuckerman et al. 2007), as that the most frequent pattern (and 
transitions) are changes in and out of party preference.12 Despite the con-
siderable amount of volatility within- and between party blocks, voting in-
tentions are nevertheless relatively stable. Nearly half of respondents name 
only one party over the nine years and 63 percent remain within the same 
party block. 
We will look now more closely at the subsample of respondents hav-
ing changed their party preference (N = 867). This is important because 
measured changes might represent different things: “conversions” from 
one party to another, ambiguity between two or several preferences (Zal-
ler 1992), measurement error (Achen 1975) or random changes (Converse 
1967). Among the changers, we firstly look at the number of parties named 
in the nine years: 69 percent of the changers named just two parties, 26 
percent named three different parties and only five percent named four 
or more parties. The fact that respondents switch mostly between two or 
three parties only, shows clearly that most changes do not represent ran-
dom answers. It rather indicates that even among changers there is a cer-
tain amount of stability, in the sense that party preferences are limited to 
12  Results for Germany are based on data of the Socio Economic Panel (SOEP) which 
measures not voting intention but party identification. Schmitt-Beck et al. (2006) found that 
about 42% of voters changed their party identification within 18 years compared to 43% in 
nine years in our sample for Switzerland.
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Figure 2: Number of Changes in Party Preference in % of Voters Changing 
between Parties (N = 867)
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two or three parties. In the next step we investigate whether these changes 
are one-time changes and therefore reflect “conversions” or whether voters 
switch back and forth between their preferred parties. This is presented in 
Figure 2, which shows the relationship between the number of parties and 
the number of changes. 
For respondents who named two different parties within nine years, it is 
more frequent to switch between them several times than to change prefer-
ence just once. The same applies for respondents having named three or 
four parties. A change in party preference can therefore not generally be 
interpreted as a conversion in the sense that respondents abandon a party 
and form a preference for another party. It is more likely that preferences 
for several parties are present simultaneously. This corresponds to Zaller’s 
view (1992) that individuals are usually ambiguous in their opinions and 
that answers given to a question depend on what consideration is at the 
“top of the head” in that particular moment. Neither models who interpret 
changes as a result of random answers (Converse 1967), nor models who 
attribute them to measurement error (Achen 1975) are supported by our 
data. Patterns also show that labels such as activation, conversion or demo-
bilisation which are often used to classify transitions in two-wave panels 
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might be misleading. What is e.g. characterized as conversion is just as 
likely to represent ambiguity between two parties and what is character-
ized as demobilization and activation is more likely to represent a weak 
party preference, indicated by switching in and out of party preference.
Explaining Changes in Party Preference
In this section, we aim at explaining changes in preference between dif-
ferent parties by empirically testing the hypotheses derived in the theory 
section. To be able to include time-dependent explanatory variables, we 
will look at transitions as the unit of analysis rather than at patterns over 
all panel waves as in the previous section. The number of observations per 
respondent varies between two and eight (for those having participated in 
all nine waves). Additional advantages of focusing at transitions are that 
sample size increases both in terms of individuals and observations and 
that attrition effects should be smaller than when looking at the balanced 
panel only. 
Operationalisation of the Dependent Variable
The dependent variable has three categories: within-block changes in par-
ty-preference (1), between-block changes in party preference (2) and no 
change in party preference (3). The latter includes both stable party prefer-
ences and – if a party preference has been named in any of the previous 
waves – observations with no party preference. If no party preference has 
been indicated so far, observations are excluded from the sample, in order 
not to mix “stable non-identifiers” and “no-changers” who have had a party 
preference before. We adopt this way of coding to be able to detect indirect 
changes in party preference where some waves of “no preference” are in 
between two different parties. The coding of the dependent variable is il-
lustrated in Table 1, for simplicity without the distinction of party blocks.
The dependent variable contains 28’587 transitions,13 of which eight per-
cent are changes within the same party block and nine percent are chang-
es between party blocks. Our model of choice is a competing-risk event 
history model with repeated events (see also Schmitt-Beck et al. 2006). 
13  For the analysis we dropped 228 cases with missing values in one of the independent 
variables, so that we end up with 28’359 transitions to be included in our model.
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Table 1: Illustration of Coding of Dependent Variable
Patterns Coding of Transition (Dependent Variable)
1 A A A B B B A A - S S C S S C S
2 n n n B n n n n - - - - S S S S
3 A A A n A n B A - S S S S S C C
4 n n B x B n x B - - - - S S - S
5 n n n n n n n n - - - - - - - -
Notes: Patterns: A = Party A; B = Party B; n = No Preference; x = Missing Information. 
Coding of Transition: S = No Change; C = Change in Party Preference; - = Excluded from 
Sample or Missing Observation.
As we have several transitions per individual in the data, we will adjust 
our model for individual heterogeneity with a random effects model (e.g. 
Oakes 1992; Baltagi 2005; Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2007) that takes into 
account unobserved effects across subjects. Individual effects are treated 
as random draws from a multinomial logistic distribution. 
Operationalisation of Independent Variables
For party preference of other household members (Hypothesis 1), we take 
values from of the previous wave of the panel, so that the cause is cer-
tain to precede the effect. The reference category contains respondents 
not living with other (Swiss) adults. Three dummy variables (agreement, 
disagreement, other constellation) reflect constellations of party preference 
for respondents living with a partner. The category “other constellation” 
contains cases where one of the partners did not have any party prefer-
ence or did not participate in the survey in the previous wave. Another 
three dummy variables (agreement, disagreement, other constellation) re-
flect constellations for respondents living with household members other 
than their partner. If there are two or more household-members besides a 
partner, their influence is coded as agreement if there are more agreements 
than disagreements and vice versa. If there are as many persons agreeing as 
disagreeing, it is attributed to the category “other constellation”. 
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The electoral cycle (Hypothesis 2), is measured by the difference in 
terms of days between the date of the interview and the date of the next or 
previous election (whichever is closer). 
Political sophistication (Hypothesis 3) is preferably measured through 
knowledge questions (Zaller 1992). As this information is however not 
available in the SHP, we will rely on both the educational level (three lev-
els) and political interest (self-placement on a scale from 0 (not at all inter-
ested) to 10 (very interested)) which are frequently used as proxies. 
Regarding the strength of socio-structural predispositions (Hypothesis 
4) we largely follow the approach presented by Lachat (2007: 201ff.). As 
a first step we regress the different parties on social class, region (rural vs 
urban) and religion (see results in appendix). Secondly, for each individual, 
we calculate predicted probabilities to vote for each of the parties. Thirdly 
we keep for each individual the highest predicted probability to indicate 
predisposition strength, irrespectively of which party has the highest value. 
Finally we recode these maximum probabilities into the 0 to 1 range. 
For the measurement of social class which is needed to calculate pre-
disposition strength, we apply the class concept and coding-scheme devel-
oped by Kriesi (1989) and adopted by Lachat (2007) which distinguishes 
the following classes: self-employed farmers and other self-employed, un-
skilled workers, skilled workers, routine non-manual employees, manag-
ers and administrative specialists, technical specialists and social-cultural 
specialists. As common in literature, social class is preferably assigned at 
the individual level, taking partner’s or parent’s social position as a proxy 
in order to assign a social class to the maximum of respondents (e.g. Güve-
li and de Graaf 2007; Müller 1999: 153; Knutsen 2003).14 For religion we 
included the following dummy variables: Catholic denomination and at-
tendance of religious services at least once a month, catholic denomination 
14  Class positions are assigned according to respondent’s current job if they were employed 
at the time of the interview. For those not employed, the assignment of a class position 
was attempted by using a (hierarchical) succession of proxies: respondent’s last occupation 
from previous panel waves; respondent’s recalled last job; respondent’s occupation in later 
panel waves; spouse’s current occupation; spouse’s last occupation from previous panel 
waves; spouse’s recalled last occupation; respondent’s father’s occupation; respondent’s 
mother’s occupation; respondent’s father’s occupation from previous waves; respondent’s 
mother’s occupation from previous waves; respondent’s father’s recalled last occupation; 
respondent’s mother’s recalled last occupation; father’s or mother’s occupation at age 15 
for respondents up 40 years of age. With this procedure, only for 85 individuals (314 ob-
servations) out of the 6’962 individuals considered in the analysis, no class could be as-
signed.
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and religious participation less than once a month, protestant denomination 
and attendance of religious services at least once a month, protestant de-
nomination and religious participation less than one a month and all others 
(reference category). The region is measured by distinguishing rural and 
other communities based on the community typology of the Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office. 
Because of left-truncation and right-censoring of the data, it is problem-
atic to measure time since last change in party preference (Hypothesis 5) in 
terms of years since last party change. The problem of left-truncation arises 
as we do not know how long a party preference has been held before the 
first panel wave. Right censoring arises from the fact that we do not know 
how long a party preference will be held for ongoing spells or how long 
it lasted for respondents having left the panel. A strategy commonly used 
in duration models is to limit the sample to the balanced panel of those 
having participated in all waves and/or to drop left-truncated spells. In our 
case this is not appropriate, as we would induce a considerable selection 
bias and an enormous reduction of the sample size. We therefore opt for a 
relative measure of time, measured by the number of observations a party 
preference has been held (or not been changed) relative to the number of 
observations available for an individual so far. In other words, the variable 
“time since last party change” represents the actual duration of a party 
preference relative to the potential maximum duration.15 
The coding of party size (governmental party vs. small parties, Hy-
pothesis 7) has already been discussed in the theory section and is straight 
forward. For Hypothesis 8, we include the “effective number of parties” 
introduced by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). For the canton Appenzell In-
nerrhoden, where the effective number of parties cannot be calculated, we 
imputed observations with the mean value.
In addition to variables corresponding to the presented hypotheses we 
will include the following control variables into the model: gender, inter-
view language to account for the linguistic regions in Switzerland and sat-
isfaction with democracy which could be an indicator for changes in party 
preference out of protest. Satisfaction with democracy is measured on a 
scale form 0 (not at all satisfied) to 10 (very satisfied). Descriptive statistics 
of all independent variables are presented in Table 2. 
15  A problem consists however in the coding of the first observation. Actual duration rela-
tive to potential duration is equal to 1 irrespective of whether a change has occurred or 
not.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Independent Variables
Independent Variables Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Household Members (Ref.: No Other Hh-member) 0.46 0.50 0 1
Partner: Disagreement 0.10 0.30 0 1
Partner: Agreement 0.20 0.40 0 1
Partner: Other Constellation 0.19 0.39 0 1
Other Hh-member: Disagreement 0.03 0.17 0 1
Other Hh-member: Agreement 0.04 0.19 0 1
Other Hh-member: Other Constellation 0.04 0.21 0 1
Distance to National Elections (in years) 1.00 0.68 0 2
Distance to Cantonal Election (in years) 0.99 0.55 0 2.21
Socio-structural Predispositions 0.51 0.25 0 1
Time since last Party Change 0.87 0.26 0.13 1
Age (years of age divided by ten) 4.87 1.58 1.8 9.5
Interest in Politics 6.38 2.34 0 10
Educational Level (Ref.: Low Education) 0.12 0.33 0 1
Intermediate Education 0.63 0.48 0 1
High Education 0.25 0.43 0 1
Small Party (Ref.: FDP, CVP, SPS, SVP) 0.10 0.30 0 1
Effective Number of Parties 4.44 0.88 0 6.7
Satisfaction with Democracy 6.18 1.80 0 10
Male (Ref.: Female) 0.46 0.50 0 1
German Speaking 0.70 0.46 0 1
Italian Speaking 0.04 0.19 0 1
French Speaking 0.26 0.44 0 1
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Results
The model which tests for the hypotheses derived in the theory section is 
presented in Table 3. The zero-model (M0) includes only the random inter-
cept of respondents. In Model 1, all independent variables are added.16 The 
overall performance for Model 1 in terms of McFaddens Pseudo-R2 is 0.05 
and in terms of the reduction of unexplained individual heterogeneity, the 
variation in individual intercepts is reduced by 66 percent. Most hypoth-
eses can be confirmed in terms of significance of the coefficients and the 
direction of the effects. Because many variables are dummies or are coded 
into a range between 0 and 1, the size of coefficients can be directly com-
pared. Changes in predicted probabilities for the minimum and maximum 
value of each variable are also presented in Table 4.
Coefficients of party preferences of household members generally con-
firm our hypotheses. Disagreement in party preference with a partner or 
with other household members increases the probability of a change in 
party preference (Hypothesis 1a), while agreement has a stabilising effect 
(Hypothesis 1b). Taking the differences between agreement and disagree-
ment and considering that effects of a partner and of other household mem-
bers add together, preferences of household members might add up to a 
relatively high maximum impact on the predicted probabilities relative to 
the other variables (up to 4.1% for within-block changes and up to 14.2% 
for between-block changes). Coefficients of within-household effects are 
ambiguous about the questions whether agreement or disagreement has a 
stronger impact or whether partners or other household are more influen-
tial. But we can say that the hypothesis by McPhee (1963) and Huckfeldt 
and Sprague (1995), who argue that it is disagreement that primarily drives 
preference change, cannot be supported, as most coefficients for agreement 
are higher in absolute value than for disagreement. We also see that living 
with other household members by itself already has a stabilising effect on 
party preference, as indicated by the coefficients of “other constellations”. 
And according to our results, the most influential within-household con-
stellation is agreement between partners: it decreases the probability for a 
within-block change by 1.9 percent and the probability for a between-block 
16  We also ran a series of alternative models in order to test for miss-specifications of the 
model. These involve the inclusion of interaction effects between political sophistication 
and predisposition strength as suggested by Lachat (2007), interactions between within-
household influences and gender and a non-linear relationship of the time variable. None of 
these effects has shown to increase the fit of the model.
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Table 3: Results of Random-Effects Multinomial Logistic Model
Notes: Dependent Variable: No Change in Party Preference (Reference Category), Change 
within Party Blocks, Change between Party Blocks; Confidence Levels: * = 95%, ** = 99%; 
N (Observations) = 28’359; N (Individuals) = 6’962.
Model 0 Model 1
Within Between
Household Members (Ref.: No Other
Hh-member)
Partner: Disagreement  0.15*  0.30**
Partner: Agreement -0.64** -0.93**
Partner: Other Constellation -0.17*  0.04  
Other Hh-member: Disagreement  0.38**  0.36**
Other Hh-member: Agreement -0.15  -0.32**
Other Hh-member: Other Constellation -0.26* -0.24*
Distance to National Elections (in years) -0.30** -0.21**
Distance to Cantonal Election (in years) -0.13**  0.06  
Socio-structural Predispositions  0.02 -0.56**
Time since last Party Change -1.16** -1.14**
Age (years of age divided by ten) -0.07** -0.08**
Interest in Politics  0.16**  0.09* 
Interest in Politics: Squared Term -0.01** -0.01**
Educational Level (Ref.: Low Education)
Intermediate Education  0.06  -0.15  
High Education  0.28** -0.26**
Small Party (Ref.: FDP, CVP, SPS, SVP)  1.13** -0.17* 
Effective Number of Parties  0.13**  0.02  
Satisfaction with Democracy -0.01  -0.04**
Male (Ref.: Female)  0.02   0.07  
German Speaking -0.48**  0.25**
Italian Speaking  0.09  -0.18  
Constant -1.84** -0.43
Log Likelihood (Model) -15’593 -14’746
Pseudo-R2 (McFadden)   0.054
Variation between Individuals (ui) 1.89**     0.66**
Reduction of ui 0.65
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Table 4: Changes in Predicted Probabilities Caused by Independent Variables
Notes: Predicted Probabilities assume an individual Effect of 0 (Mean of Random Variable). 
Explanatory Variables are held at their Mean (Continuous Variables) or at their Mode (Cat-
egorical Variables), which results in a Probability of 4.4% for a Within-block Change and a 
Probability of 9.7% for a Between-block Change.
change by 5.5 percent. Generally, results confirm the importance of includ-
ing influences of other household members besides partners into the model 
and our findings are largely in line with existing literature for Germany and 
Great Britain (e.g. Schmitt-Beck et al. 2006; Zuckerman et al. 2007). 
Also the context of the electoral cycle influences individual-level vola-
tility (Hypothesis 2), particularly for national elections. The probability 
for a within-block change is 2.3 percent higher at the national election 
date than in between national elections (3.4% for between-block changes). 
Within Between
Dummy Variables (change compared to reference category)
Other Household Members (Ref.: No Other Hh-member) 
Partner: Disagreement 0.5 2.9
Partner: Agreement -1.9 -5.5
Partner: Other Constellation -0.7 n.s.
Other Hh-member: Disagreement 1.7 3.4
Other Hh-member: Agreement n.s. -2.4
Other Hh-member: Other Constellation -0.9 -1.8
Educational Level (Ref.: Intermediate Education)
Low Education n.s. n.s.
High Education 0.5 -2.2
Party Size (Ref.: Governmental Party)
Small Party 8.1 -2.1
Intervall Variables (Prob. Max. Value minus Prob. Min. Value)
Distance to National Elections (in years) -2.3 -3.4
Distance to Cantonal Election (in years) -1.3 n.s.
Sociostructural Predispositions n.s. -4.5
Time since last Party Change (Relative, Index 0 to 1) -4.8 -10.2
Age (years of age divided by ten) -2.0 -5.3
Effective Number of Parties 1.5 n.s.
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Cantonal elections have about half of the impact of national elections and 
are not significant for between-block changes. 
Evidence for the hypothesis regarding political sophistication is mixed 
(Hypothesis 3). As expected, there is a significant non-linear effect be-
tween political interest and voting intention. A look at predicted probabili-
ties however shows a rather different relation for within-block changes 
and between-block changes (see Figure 3). For within-block changes, 
the positive effect dominates, while the negative effect dominates for be-
tween-block changes. While between-block changes are most frequent for 
respondents with below-average levels of interest in politics, within-block 
changes are most frequent for highly interested respondents. This pattern 
is partly confirmed by the education variable, with tertiary education lev-
els decreasing the probability for between-block changes and increasing 
the probability for within-block changes. With the exception of Lachat 
(2007),17 other studies on volatility of party preference or party identifi-
cation did not test for non-linear influence of political sophistication and 
remained vague on why political interest should influence party change 
(Arzheimer and Schoen 2005, Schmitt-Beck et al. 2006, Zuckerman et al. 
2007). Our results demonstrate the appropriateness of Zaller’s theory and 
of including a quadratic term of political sophistication into the model. 
They reveal however also the necessity to further reflect and investigate on 
the effect of political sophistication, particularly on the striking differences 
of between- and within-block changes.
Hypothesis 4 on the stabilising effect of socio-structural predispositions 
for between-block changes is supported by the data. The stronger an in-
dividual is predisposed towards a party according to his socio-structural 
characteristics, the less likely become changes between party blocks. The 
probability of a between-block change for respondents with the strongest 
socio-structural predispositions is 4.5 percent lower than for respondents 
who have no clear predispositions. This result is in line with findings from 
Lachat (2007: 132ff.) on recalled voting in Switzerland and from aggre-
gate-level analysis by Bartolini and Mair.18 Even though the relevance of 
socio-structural variables might have decreased since the studies by La-
17  His results (based on Swiss electoral surveys and on variables of recalled voting) con-
firm the non-linearity of the relationship between political sophistication and volatility. 
However, results for between- and within-block changes hardly differed for Switzerland.
18  Lachat however did not separate between socio-structural and psychological predisposi-
tions.
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Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities of Change in Party Preference for Interest in Politics
zarsfeld and his collegues (1948) and by Butler and Stokes (1974), they 
still have a stabilising effect on voting intentions.
Also reinforcing mechanisms of existing preferences as claimed by 
the Michigan Model of voting are supported by our data. The duration, a 
party preference has been held (Hypothesis 5), is in fact the most influen-
tial explanatory variable for between-block changes and the second most 
influential variable for within-block changes (after party size). Because 
we included time since last change not in terms of years, but rather as a 
relative measure, we cannot specify the relationship between duration and 
change more precisely. Also age has a stabilising effect on party preference 
(Hypothesis 6). Because of multicollinearity, we were however not able 
to separate cohort- from age effects and therefore cannot exclude the pos-
sibility that the relationship is not caused by life experience as stated in the 
hypothesis, but rather by cohort effects.19 Our results for duration and age 
are in line with those obtained by Schmitt-Beck et al. (2006) for changes in 
party identification in Germany.
Lastly, also the two party-system characteristics show considerable ef-
fects on within-block changes. The distinction between small and govern-
mental parties (Hypothesis 7) is the variable which most affects the proba-
bility for within-block changes. The probability for a change between party 
19  The relationship between life course and stability has been discussed in detail e.g. by 
Krosnik and Alwin (1989, 1991).
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blocks increases by eight percent when respondents had a preference for 
a small party in the previous wave. Also the effective number of parties in 
a canton influences volatility within party blocks (Hypothesis 8), however 
to a much smaller extent than party size. While the number of parties does 
not affect between-block changes, the size of the party has a small influ-
ence on between-block changes that was not expected by the model. But 
taken together, our results confirm results of aggregate level analysis at the 
country level (Pedersen 1983; Bartolini and Mair 1990). 
Conclusions
In this paper we have been looking at stability and change of party pref-
erence at the individual level using data of the Swiss Household Panel 
(1999–2007). In the first part, we described patterns of change. Most fre-
quent are respondents who change in and out of a party preference. With 
nearly half of respondents having switched at least once between parties, 
volatility reveals to be rather high. Furthermore, these changes occur not 
primarily within party blocks, as changes between party blocks are also 
relatively frequent. We therefore cannot confirm the hypothesis by Barto-
lini and Mair (1990) of stability between party blocks, at least for the peri-
od of observation. Apart from the possibility of measurement errors, there 
are two main explanations for this high volatility. Firstly, gross changes 
between parties are much more frequent than net changes in electoral re-
sults. Secondly, the frequent between-block changes are mostly due to the 
rise of the SVP, which has transformed the Swiss party system from the 
1990s onwards. We further found that changes over nine years involve 
mostly just two parties and that it is quite common to move back and forth 
between two (or three) parties. Despite this remarkable volatility, there is 
nevertheless a high stability in voting intention. 45 percent of respondents 
named only one party during the nine years and 63 remained within the 
same party block. And looking at transitions, only 17 percent involve a 
within- or between block change.
In the second part we tried to explain why changes in party preference 
from one party to another occur. We based our theoretical framework on 
approaches from different research fields. Firstly we recurred to traditional 
models of voting – cleavage theory, the Columbia model and the Michigan 
model – where stability in electoral choice plays a central role. As regards 
to socio-structural predispositions (measured by social class, religion and 
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region), they still reveal to have a stabilising effect. More precisely, results 
show that stability of voting intentions depends on the strength of socio-
structural predispositions. As regards psychological predispositions, data 
show a reinforcing mechanism of party preference: Stability increases with 
the duration a party preference has been held and the older the respondent 
becomes. Another central aspect of the Columbia model, the consideration 
of contextual effects, has also shown to be highly relevant, both for within-
household influences and for electoral campaigns. Secondly, we demon-
strated that political sophistication has a non-linear influence on changes 
in party preference. Zaller’s RAS-model is thus well suited to explain the 
effect of political sophistication which has remained vague in most ex-
isting analyses on individual volatility. Thirdly we included variables of 
party (system) characteristics that have shown to be relevant in studies on 
aggregate-level volatility. The size of parties and the effective number of 
parties in a canton indeed have an influence on volatility at the individual 
level, too. 
Unlike other studies using panel data, we distinguished within- and be-
tween block changes in our analysis. Socio-structural predispositions on 
the one hand, which represent respondent’s positions along cleavage lines, 
only effect changes between party blocks but are irrelevant for changes 
within party blocks. Party-system related reasons for preference changes 
on the other hand, effect particularly within-block changes. Another im-
portant difference of the two types of changes involves political sophis-
tication. Between-block changes are most frequent among respondents 
with lower interest in politics and lower educational levels. Within-block 
changes are most frequent among respondents with higher interest in poli-
tics and high educational levels. 
The broad theoretical approach demonstrates that it is fruitful to com-
bine insights from different research fields, as each is able to explain a 
part of individual-level volatility. However, this approach also leaves many 
questions open: particularly the influences among household members and 
the striking differences for the effect of political sophistication on within- 
and between-block changes require more in-depth analysis and theoretical 
reflections. But even with this broad approach, a large part of the variance 
in volatility remains unexplained and shows the need for further research 
on that topic. Lastly, because our model is not specific to any particular 
party, the model and hypotheses should be transferable to other party sys-
tems as well. 
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Stabilität und Wandel von Parteipräferenzen
Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Stabilität und Volatilität von Parteipräferenz anhand 
der Daten des Schweizer Haushalt-Panels (SHP) von 1999−2007, die es zum ersten 
Mal ermöglichen, Wählerwanderungen bzw. -stabilität in der Schweiz über mehrere 
Beobachtungszeitpunkte hinweg zu betrachten. In den Analysen wird systematisch 
zwischen Wechsel innerhalb und Wechsel zwischen Parteifamilien unterschieden. Der 
erste Teil untersucht die Muster der Parteienpräferenz, die eine relativ starke Volatili-
tät in der Wahlabsicht zeigen. Verschiedene Theorien zu den Ursachen von Wechseln 
zwischen Parteien werden in einem zweiten Teil anhand eines multinomialen Ran-
dom-Effects Modells getestet. Die Resultate zeigen, dass sich Parteipräferenz mit 
ihrer Dauer und mit dem Alter stabilisiert und dass der Wahlzyklus, politisches In-
teresse, soziostrukturelle Prädispositionen, der Haushaltskontext sowie Parteigrösse 
und Anzahl Parteien einen Teil der Volatilität erklären. Unterschiedliche Resultate für 
Wechsel innerhalb und zwischen Parteifamilien unterstreichen die Bedeutung dieser 
Differenzierung.
Stabilité et volatilité des préferences partisanes
Cette contribution analyse la stabilité et la volatilité des préférences partisanes en 
utilisant les données du Panel Suisse de Ménages (PSM) de 1999 à 2007; celles-ci 
permettent, pour la première fois, d’analyser au niveau individuel les transitions et la 
stabilité du choix électoral en Suisse sur plusieurs années. La première partie présente 
les différents types de transitions en distinguant notamment les changements entre et 
à l’intérieur des différentes familles de partis. Diverses théories expliquant cette vo-
latilité sont testées dans la deuxième partie avec un modèle « Random-effects » mul-
tinomial. Les résultats montrent que les préférences partisanes se stabilisent avec leur 
durée et avec l’âge, mais aussi que le cycle électoral, l’intérêt politique, les prédispo-
sitions socio-structurelles, les caractéristiques du ménage ainsi que la taille des partis 
et le nombre de partis expliquent une partie de la volatilité. Il ressort notamment des 
différences importantes dans les résultats relatifs aux changements entre et à l’intérieur 
des familles politiques.
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